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Outlook and Appraisal 
During 1984 the British economy maintained 
the growth ra te of 2.5% achieved in the 
lat ter part of 1983. Growth in 1984 was 
depressed by the coal dispute which meant 
the d i rec t loss of mining income and 
output and an associated reduction in the 
overall demand for the output of sectors 
such as Metal Goods and Mechanical 
Engineering. Resolution of the miners' 
dispute in the early part of the year and 
a ful l return to work w i l l , with the 
associated "rebound" in activity, lead to 
a growth rate for 1985 of around 3%. The 
longer the dispute i s prolonged, the 
closer UK growth to the end of 1985 wil l 
approach the underlying ra te of about 
2.5%. 
The r e su l t s or the January 1985 Scottish 
B u s i n e s s Survey i n d i c a t e l i t t l e 
improvement in optimism among Scottish 
industrialists. Firms in manufacturing 
report only marginally greater optimism 
about the general business situation while 
firms in construction are less optimistic 
than three months e a r l i e r . Greater 
optimism was expressed, however, among 
firms in the distribution sector, almost 
ent i re ly as a consequence of continuing 
buoyancy in r e t a i l i n g . Expected 
employment p a t t e r n s r e f l e c t these 
differences in optimism. L i t t l e change 
in employment i s foreseen by manufacturers 
while construction firms expect further 
lay-offs. Only in retailing do companies 
expect to take on more labour. This 
intended increase in employment applies 
however, predominantly to p a r t - t i m e 
w o r k e r s . As noted in p r e v i o u s 
Commentaries, such employment expansion 
has l i t t l e impact on unemployment figures 
as many of the workers hired are females 
entering or re-entering the labour force, 
who were not previously regis tered as 
unemployed. 
An important feature of UK growth during 
1984 was t h e r i s e in i n v e s t m e n t 
expend i tu re , inc lud ing manufacturing 
investment. In real terms indus t r ia l 
investment in the third quarter of 1984 
was 7% higher than in the corresponding 
quarter of 1983. In part th i s was a 
consequence of higher company profits and 
liquidity during 1983-84. But investment 
expenditure i s l ike ly to f a l l to a lower 
level in 1985 because the 1984 increase 
was due also to a bringing forward of 
p r o j e c t s . This was induced by the 
announcement in the 1984 Budget of the 
phasing out of capi ta l allowances and by 
uncertainty about the outcome of the 
regional policy review in November 1984. 
For S c o t t i s h f i r m s t h e l a t t e r 
consideration proved well-founded. Under 
the revised regional policy replacement 
investment i s no longer g r a n t - a i d e d : 
c e r t a i n a r ea s of Scotland no longer 
qua l i fy for a s s i s t a n c e ; and o v e r a l l 
payments of Regional Development Grants 
are likely to be reduced by well over half 
in the coming year (see Briefing Paper). 
Real i n t e re s t ra tes at the beginning of 
1985 are at historically high levels as a 
consequence of measures to defend sterling 
and high US interest rates. Continuation 
of interest rates at such levels will act 
to depress investment demand, and also 
consumption demand, over the coming 
months. 
The rise in UK exports also contributed to 
growth during 1984. However, export 
expansion was modest by internat ional 
standards, with UK exports growing more 
slowly than the volume of internat ional 
trade and with a widening gap in UK trade 
in manufactures. The re la t ive ly poor 
performance of manufactured exports i s 
particularly disappointing in view of the 
acceleration of growth in EEC markets 
which account for half of such exports and 
the weakness of s te r l ing against the 
dol lar . Exporters generally failed to 
take f u l l advantage of the s t imulus 
imparted to world trade by the massive US 
trade de f i c i t . As the US economy slows 
down this stimulus will s tart to evaporate 
in 1985. 
During 1984 public expenditure overshot 
p lanned t a r g e t s . P a r t of t h e 
unanticipated growth in public spending 
was a consequence of the coal dispute, 
part reflected the higher than expected 
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number of claimants for unemployment and 
supplementary benefit and the remainder 
resulted from increased debt in te res t 
payments. The government's Publ ic 
Expenditure White Paper suggests broadly 
stable public spending in the coming year, 
providing l i t t l e boost to demand. 
The consumer boom, in which the Scottish 
Business Survey suggests Scotland has 
shared f u l l y , looks se t to cont inue . 
Consumption expenditure i s l ikely to be 
higher than in 1984 p a r t l y because 
earnings continue to run 3-4% ahead of 
price inf la t ion and partly because of 
recovery after the ending of the miners' 
strike. A further boost will be given to 
consumption expenditure if the Chancellor 
i s able to deliver promised cuts in income 
tax in the March Budget. 
Tax cuts w i l l , the Chancellor contends, 
lead to employment c r e a t i o n . The 
scope for tax reductions i s 
circumscribed by a number of influences. 
In November 1984 the Chancel lor ' s 
arithmetic suggested tax cuts could amount 
to some £1.5bn. Subsequent g r e a t e r 
optimism about levels of North Sea oi l 
production during 1985 pointed to a higher 
amount. However, the recent downward 
pressures on oi l prices have an opposite 
e f f e c t . The behav iou r of t he 
s t e r l ing /do l la r exchange ra te further 
complicates the ar i thmetic . Since the 
Chancellor's tax take i s based on the 
d o l l a r p r i c e of o i l , s t e r l i n g 
depreciation, largely in response to lower 
oil prices themselves, increases revenues. 
In contrast, scope for tax cuts is reduced 
by higher debt service charges resul t ing 
from the recent increases in in te res t 
rates to half sterling depreciation. An 
outcome broadly in line with the November 
figure would permit the Chancellor to 
raise tax thresholds by 10%. 
The Chancellor advocates tax cuts on the 
grounds that they will improve the supply 
s ide of the economy by s t i m u l a t i n g 
ini t iat ive and willingness to work and by 
reducing demands for pay r i s e s . This 
r e p r e s e n t s a s h i f t from the more 
conventional argument for tax cuts as a 
means of creating jobs, namely that they 
s t i m u l a t e demand. The demand-based 
argument has frequently been eschewed on 
the grounds that increased disposable 
income i s spent on imported rather than 
domestically-produced goods. However, 
the supply-side mechanisms identif ied by 
the Chancellor are unconvincing. 
The incentive effects of tax cuts are 
unlikely to be very great. A 10% rise in 
tax thresholds would remove over a million 
households from tax. But over 40% of 
these would be pensioner households who no 
longer par t ic ipa te in the labour market. 
Less than 10% would be heads of households 
among whom higher tax thresholds may 
indeed reduce rather than increase the 
will ingness to work since, by rais ing 
disposable incomes, lower taxes may mean 
the l o s s of means- tes ted b e n e f i t s . 
Higher income earners who receive larger 
absolute increases in af ter- tax incomes 
may opt not for greater effort but for 
greater leisure. 
Young people who comprise about 25% of 
those removed from tax might have greater 
incentives to seek work. But removal 
from tax for th i s group takes place at 
earnings over £40 per week, a level which 
employers might not be prepared to pay for 
new e n t r a n t s t o the labour market. 
Employers might find greater willingness 
to work and greater f l ex ib i l i t y in work 
practices among the remaining 15% removed 
from tax, working wives. But tax cuts 
for th i s group, rather than tackling the 
increasingly pol i t ical ly-sensi t ive issue 
of unemployment, may simply reinforce the 
attraction into the labour market of women 
not previously registered as unemployed. 
Tax cuts are also unlikely to lead to 
lower wage demands. The effects of cuts 
in d i rect income taxation wil l be offset 
whe re , as i s e x p e c t e d , they a r e 
accompanied by an extension of value-added 
tax to cover presently zero-rated items 
such as books, newspapers and children's 
clothing. Moreover, typical individuals 
do not bargain with the i r employers over 
pay. That function is peformed by unions 
and no ra t ional union wi l l s e t t l e below 
t h e going r a t e . 
Cr i t ics of the Chancellor, including the 
CBI, argue that increased government 
expenditure ought to be given greater 
priority than tax cuts. The Chancellor's 
opposition is two-fold. First, he blames 
the UK's poor performance on high 
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government expendi tu re and taxation. 
Attr ibuting cause and effect i s however, 
problematic. Causation may well run in 
the opposite direct ion with poor growth 
requiring increased government expenditure 
on, for example, unemployment benefits and 
a c t i o n t o s t i m u l a t e t he economy. 
Secondly, the Chancellor argues t h a t 
higher government expenditure will cause 
interest rates to rise. Yet in November 
he added the cost of the coal dispute to 
the PSBR wi thout r e fe rence to d i r e 
consequences, suggesting tha t there i s 
more room f o r h i g h e r government 
expenditure than he concedes. 
If, as argued above, the supply-side 
effects associated with tax cuts are 
l imited, the i r main impact wi l l operate 
through demand, and on the demand side 
government expenditure scores against tax 
cuts. The whole amount i s injected into 
demand: unlike tax cuts where part wi l l 
leak into savings. Moreover, Government 
expenditure can be directed to particular 
a c t i v i t i e s in specif ic areas; declining 
i n n e r - c i t y a reas and d e t e r i o r a t i n g 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and 
sewers could be improved. 
If , for i d e o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , t he 
Chancellor opposes higher government 
expenditure, an a l t e rna t ive approach to 
job c r e a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e which i s 
ent i re ly consistent with his supply-side 
emphasis. Much of the Chancel lor ' s 
rhetoric has been directed at the need to 
reduce u n i t labour c o s t s , with h i s 
preferred solution being one of wage cuts 
(see November Commentary). Unit labour 
costs , however, also include non-wage 
costs , an element which the Chancellor 
could take action to reduce. 
In November 1984, as statutorily required, 
the Chancellor increased the l imi t s for 
e m p l o y e r s ' n a t i o n a l i n s u r a n c e 
contributions in l ine with the ra te of 
inflation. He could take the opportunity 
of the forthcoming Budget to reduce the 
rate of contribution paid by employers for 
new workers. That would have a more 
immediate and direct impact on employment 
prospects than income tax reductions. 
15 February 1985 
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The World Economy 
During 1984 the growth rates of the major 
industrial economies converged. This did 
not resu l t from a marked increase in the 
pace of recovery in European countries. 
Rather themodest recovery in Europe 
continued while the US economy decelerated 
from i t s very rapid rate of growth in the 
f i r s t half of the year. This narrowing 
of growth rates i s expected to continue in 
1985. As in 1984, the course of world 
recovery during 1985 wil l be largely 
influenced by inter-rela ted developments 
in the US budget and current account 
deficits. The size of the budget deficit 
affects levels of interest rates while US 
imports affect the volume of world trade. 
OUTPUT 
In the f i r s t six months of 1984 US output 
grew by more than 8$, but increases in 
in te res t r a t e s , associated with rapidly 
increasing demand for credit, contributed 
to slower growth in the second half of the 
year. During the third quarter slowing 
demand and increased import penetration 
caused corporate prof i t s to stagnate. 
Pressure on domestic capacity util isation 
also eased and production slowed as firms 
moderated the i r inventory accumulation. 
There are, however, signs tha t , with 
interest rates falling from the high levels 
of the summer, the US economy i s 
recovering some momentum. In November the 
Commerce Department reported that the 
composite index of leading indicators 
rose, suggesting an upturn in domestic 
capacity in early 1985 above the levels of 
the l a t t e r part of 1984. US growth in 
1985 is expected to be of the order of 3?. 
Largely re f l ec t ing the t h i r d q u a r t e r 
slowdown in the US economy, t o t a l 
indus t r ia l production in the OECD areas 
rose by 5.6% in the year to October, as 
compared to an increase of 7.75 in the 
year to Ju ly . With annual r a t e s of 
increase of 3.3% and 2.8J to the end of 
October indus t r ia l performance in OECD 
Europe and the EEC respectively fell some 
way short of that of North America where 
output grew by 6.9% over the same period. 
The most rapid indus t r ia l growth took 
place in Austria, Sweden, Australia, Japan 
and the Netherlands. 
The strength of the dollar and the growth 
of domestic demand resulted in growing US 
demand for the output of other countries. 
The importance of t h i s stimulus i s seen 
most clearly in the case of Japan where, 
reflecting the pattern of developments in 
the US, exports and industrial output rose 
sharply in the f i r s t half of the year, 
before slowing in the third quarter. 
Japan also increased i t s exports to Europe 
and achieved a record current account 
surplus. Export expansion continued to 
ra i se corporate prof i t s and, thereby, 
g e n e r a t e h i g h e r l e v e l s of f i x e d 
inves tment . The growth of expor ts 
contrasts with the slow growth of domestic 
demand r e s u l t i n g from the Japanese 
Government's r e s t r i c t i v e f iscal policy 
stance. 
Elsewhere, the stimulus of the US current 
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account deficit has also been evident. In 
France, for example, increased exports 
contributed to a marked improvement in the 
trade deficit and growth in West Germany 
was dependent more on exports than on 
domestic demand. In the l a t t e r country, 
as in the UK, growth was depressed by 
industrial unrest. Unlike West Germany, 
however, UK e x p o r t e r s did not take 
advantage of the growth in world t rade. 
Despite the depreciation of sterling, most 
noticeably against the dollar but also 
aga ins t o ther major c u r r e n c i e s , UK 
manufactured exports experienced l i t t l e 
growth. This, in conjunction with the 
coal d i s p u t e accounts for the UK's 
indus t r ia l performance to the end of 
October being below that of any of the 
other major industrial countries. 
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Growth in Europe has been constrained by 
domestic policies. Restrictive po l ic ies , 
aimed a t c o n t r o l l i n g in f la t ion , have 
tended to l i m i t the growth of domestic 
demand including consumption demand, which 
has until recently been the major element 
in recovery. Consumption demand has been 
particularly depressed in France where the 
anti-inflation policy embraces controls on 
wages and pr ices . Apart from exports, 
much of the impetus to growth in EEC 
countries during 1984 came from increasing 
fixed investment, in response to higher 
corpora te p r o f i t s . This increased 
investment wi l l help to sustain recovery 
in Europe. 
LABOUR MARKETS 
whole has shown l i t t l e change over the 
past year. This relative stability of the 
o v e r a l l r a t e d i s g u i s e s , however , 
differences in experience among countries. 
The unemployment ra te in the US has been 
reduced to around 7.3? from 9.7? in 1983, 
and t h i s has helped keep the OECD ra te 
s t e a d y in t h e f ace of i n c r e a s i n g 
unemployment in Europe. 
Unemployment has increased from 1983 rates 
of 10.3? and 10.2? to 11.0% and 10.6? for 
OECD Europe and the EEC respect ively. 
These increases in unemployment do not 
simply reflect the slower pace of European 
r e c o v e r y . They a r e a l s o due t o 
demographic factors and to a s t ruc tura l 
change in the nature of labour markets. 
Employment contraction has been averted 
but labour supply has been expanding more 
rapidly than employment opportunit ies . 
Part of the increase in the labour supply 
is induced by an increasing shift towards 
p a r t - t i m e employment , a tendency 
par t icular ly noticeable in the UK. This 
leads to the entry or re-entry into the 
labour market of females many of whom were 
not on the unemployment register. 
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Unemployment in the US is forecast to 
continue fa l l ing in 1985, Although less 
s r a p i d l y than in 1981. In Europe, 
however, the prospect i s of s t i l l higher 
levels of unemployment. Indeed, the OECD 
anticipates unemployment in Europe rising 
by the end of the decade to levels higher 
than at any time since the 1930's. 
With the standardised unemployment rate at 
the end of the third quarter standing at 
8.2%, unemployment in the OECD area as a 
DiFLATIOM 
Within the OECD area there has been 
widespread progress in reducing rates of 
inflation. As with growth rates, 
differences in inflation rates among the 
major countries are being reduced. For 
the OECD area as a whole the annual rate 
of inflation has been reduced from around 
13* in 1980 to 5.1% at the end of October 
1984. 
With annual rates of 7.3% and 5.7% at the 
end of the third quarter of 1984 for OECD 
Europe and the EEC respectively, inflation 
in Europe continues to exceed that in the 
US. Moreover, within Europe there is 
considerable diversity of experience with 
rates ranging from 2.1% for West Germany 
through 5.0% for UK and 9.4% for Italy, to 
18.4% for Greece. 
Consumer Price Inflation 
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Generally, inflat ionary pressures have 
been weakened by depressed o i l and 
commodity prices. In the US inflationary 
pressures have been moderated by the 
strength of the dol lar . Despite the 
s t ronger recovery than in European 
countries, the inf la t ion ra te in the US 
stands at only 4.2%. The influence of the 
exchange rate operates in a number of 
ways. The strong dollar reduces the 
domestic prices of imports; increases the 
leakage of US demand to foreign economies; 
and subjects domestic producers to greater 
competition from foreign suppliers. 
Increasing competition in product markets 
may also help account for the re la t ive ly 
low increases in wage settlements both in 
import-competing indust r ies and overal l . 
US nominal wage ra tes show no signs of 
acceleration and real wages continue to be 
under downward pressure. With output 
growth exceeding real wage increases, the 
outcome has been lower unit labour costs. 
Exchange rate movements against the dollar 
have generated opposite effects in Europe, 
but there, as in the US, growth in wages 
has been lower t han s u g g e s t e d by 
experience during previous periods of 
recovery. In West Germany wage increases j u s t over 3% have been agreed in both the 
public and private sectors . Wage growth 
in France has been restrained through 
controls with the Government imposing a 2% 
cei l ing increase on public sector wages. 
In the UK, however, the picture i s l e ss 
encouraging. Unit labour c o s t s have 
increased, particularly in manufacturing. 
For the OECD area as a whole the forecast 
f o r 1985 i s of r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e 
inflation, with a continuing narrowing of 
the differences between countries with the 
highest rates of inflation and those with 
the lowest. 
PROGNOSIS 
Predominant features of the world economy 
in 1984 were the continuing strength of 
the US dollar and high in te res t r a t es . 
The combination of an appreciating dollar 
and growing domestic demand have meant the 
US provides an expanding market for other 
countries ' exports. By the end of 1984 
the US had accumulated a current account 
deficit in excess of $120bn. A deficit of 
such magnitude would normally signal a 
dol lar depreciation. The dollar has 
remained strong, however, because the US 
has been s imul taneous ly running a 
s u b s t a n t i a l budget d e f i c i t . The 
a s soc ia t ed high i n t e r e s t r a t e s have 
attracted foreign capital inflows into the 
US and on balance the net inflows on 
capi ta l account have outweighed to date 
the opposing influence of the current 
account def ic i t . 
The combination of a strong dol lar and 
high in te res t ra tes cannot be sustained 
indef in i te ly , however. Against a back-
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ground of a very large trade de f i c i t and 
decelerating growth in the US economy, 
foreign investors will not be prepared to 
continue adding to the i r holdings of 
dollar s ecu r i t i e s . There i s no r i sk 
of the US d e f a u l t i n g on debt s ince 
ultimately dollar-denominated debt can be 
redeemed through US monetary expansion. 
But there is an exchange risk. Servicing 
increasing indebtedness requires surpluses 
on visible trade and/or further borrowing. 
Prospects of a sh i f t to trade surpluses 
are remote. And t h e r e are a l ready 
indications that foreign cap i ta l inflows 
are not proceeding a t the previous rapid 
pace. Foreign cap i ta l inflows to the US 
fe l l by around 25% between 1982 and 198M. 
The net c a p i t a l inf lows requi red to 
finance the growing de f i c i t on current 
account have come i n c r e a s i n g l y from 
reductions in US investment abroad rather 
than from more rapid capital inflows. 
costs of debt service. 
Long-Term Interest Rates 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
The contraction in foreign lending by US 
banks re f l ec t s slower growth elsewhere. 
But as international growth rates converge 
US lending abroad will recover, leading to 
a reduc t ion in net c a p i t a l in f lows . 
Reversal of the influence of the elements 
in the balance of payments will then exert 
downward pressures on the dollar. 
If, however, measures can be implemented 
to reduce the budget de f i c i t a different 
outcome may be p o s s i b l e . Reduced 
government borrowing would r e l i e v e 
p re s su re on i n t e r e s t r a t e s and with 
further slowing in net capi ta l inflows 
would induce a f a l l in the dol lar . A 
weaker dollar would then be accompanied by 
lower rather than higher interest rates . 
Depreciation of the dollar would contract 
US import demand but would r e l i e v e 
inflationary pressures in other countries 
and, par t icu lar ly in the UK, permit an 
opportunity for reductions in i n t e re s t 
r a t es . Whether r educ t ions in i n t e r -
national levels of in t e res t r a tes can be 
achieved depends crucial ly on what i s 
happening to the US budget deficit. 
Slower US growth in 1985, while reducing 
the growth of demand for c red i t from the 
private sector, wi l l at the same time 
increase the budget deficit in the absence 
of measures to cut Government spending. 
An increased budget defici t will require 
higher interest rates . 
The current debate on the US Budget i s , 
therefore, of crucial importance. There 
has been i n c r e a s i n g r ecogn i t i on in 
official circles of the need to reduce the 
budget de f ic i t and the proposals before 
Congress a re aimed a t p rogress ive 
reductions during the remaining years of 
t h e 1980s. The budge t p r o p o s a l s 
emphasise, however, the structural rather 
than the cycl ical nature of the de f i c i t . 
I t i s proposed that the deficit be reduced 
by reducing Government non-defence 
spending. Having already made substan-
t i a l cuts in social programmes, however, 
the scope for f u r t h e r cu t s t he r e i s 
l imited and the proposals may well be 
d i f f i cu l t , if not impossible, to s teer 
through Congress. 
An outcome involving dollar depreciation 
and higher interest rates will damage the 
prospects for world recovery. Third World 
countries holding dollar-denominated debts 
would be particularly adversely affected, 
with contraction in the i r major export 
market and with in te res t r a tes ra is ing 
If Congress seeks other means of reducing 
the de f i c i t , defence expenditure and tax 
policies will need to be re-assessed with 
politically unpopular decisions having to 
be made. But f a i l u r e to t a c k l e the 
problem of the budget deficit will greatly 
diminish the prospects for continuing 
recovery in the world economy. 
The British Economy 
There was no acceleration in the ra te of 
recovery in the UK economy in 1984. 
Growth was of the order of 2.5? which 
represented no improvement on the growth 
rate achieved in the l a t t e r part of 1983. 
Consumption e x p e n d i t u r e and f i x e d 
investment were the main sources of 
growth. Although s lackening in the 
l e t t e r pa r t of the year , destocking 
continued. Output growth was sluggish, 
particularly in manufacturing and, despite 
sterling depreciation, the deficit on non-
oil trade increased substantially. 
The coal dispute depressed growth in 1984. 
On the assumption of an early resolution 
to the dispute, growth in 1985 is forecast 
to be around 3?. The longer the dispute 
i s prolonged, the closer wi l l growth 
approach the underlying ra te of about 
2.5%. There i s a remarkable degree of 
consensus among forecasters about likely 
growth this year. 
Inf lat ion a t the end of 1984 was very 
close to the o f f ic ia l target of 4.5?. 
While running above 5? in each of the 
f i r s t six months of the year, inf la t ion 
was at or below 5? from July to December. 
From 4.9? in November the ra te f e l l to an 
end-year f i g u r e of 4.6? p r i n c i p a l l y 
because of reductions in mortgage ra tes . 
In contrast to the reduction in price 
inflation, the underlying rate of earnings 
inf la t ion has shown l i t t l e change. The 
reduction in the recorded rate i s due to 
the coal dispute and the delays in wage 
sett lements of groups in the public 
sector including local authority non-
manual workers. 
Employment expansion slowed in the second 
half of 1984 and the numbers of registered 
unemployed continued to r i s e . The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer has argued 
that reductions in income taxation in the 
forthcoming March Budget will contribute 
t o t h e c r e a t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t 
opportunit ies . As argued elsewhere in 
this Commentary, however, income tax cuts 
are unlikely to have any appreciable 
impact on employment and are l e s s 
effective in creating jobs than other uses 
to which the resources could be directed. 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
For most of 1984 the CSO's c y c l i c a l 
indicators presented a d i sappo in t ing 
prospect. The longer leading indicator, 
which predicts turning points about a year 
in advance, f e l l for five consecutive 
months from March. The shorter leading 
index, which predicts turning points some 
six months in advance, also fell over the 
summer. With some components depressed by 
the coal dispute, the coincident index 
remained re la t ive ly stable in the middle 
of the year. This evidence pointed to a 
downturn in economic activity around March 
1985. 
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While i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s p rob lemat ic 
because of the effects of the coal dispute 
and because the data employed are subject 
to revision, the indicators for the la t ter 
part of 1984 provide a better outlook for 
1985. Reflect ing i n c r e a s e s in share 
pr ices , the longer leading index rose in 
each of the las t three months of the year. 
The shorter leading index also rose in the 
l a s t quarter , mainly due to movements in 
new consumer credit. Upward movement was 
also evident in the coincident index. 
These upturns in the indices point to a 
more prolonged recovery with the reduction 
in the under ly ing growth r a t e being 
delayed beyond March. 
fixed capital formation in the f i r s t three 
quarters of 1984 was almost 6.5? higher 
than in the corresponding period of 1983. 
Investment recovery took place almost 
ent i re ly in the private sector. The 
Department of Trade and Industry's Survey 
of Investment In ten t ions suggests an 
increase in the volume of manufacturing 
investment of 12% over 1983 l e v e l s . 
Although slowing during the middle part of 
the year from the rapid growth in the 
f i r s t quarter of 1984, investment in 
construction, d i s t r ibu t ion and selected 
service industries was also substantially 
higher, probably of the order of 10% above 
that of 1983. 
Pre l iminary e s t i m a t e s suggest t h a t 
consumers' expenditure increased by 2% 
during the four th q u a r t e r . After 
slackening to an annual rate of less than 
1% in the third quarter, this component of 
demand increased in the las t three months 
of 1984 to an annual ra te of over 2%. 
While aggregate consumer expendi tu re 
continues to be adversely affected by the 
coal dispute, the seasonally adjusted 
estimates re f lec t increases in r e t a i l 
sales. 
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The slow downward trend in interest rates, 
higher corpora te l i q u i d i t y and the 
bringing forward of projects following the 
announcement of reductions in capi ta l 
allowances and in anticipation of reduced 
regional incentives, have contributed to 
the recovery in investment. But the pace 
of investment recovery i s expected to be 
slower this year. The DTI Survey suggests 
t h a t i n v e s t m e n t in c o n s t r u c t i o n , 
d i s t r i b u t i o n and s e l ec t e d s e rv i ce 
indust r ies wi l l increase by 9% and that 
manufacturing investment will increase by 
7%. Slackening of investment growth i s 
also indicated by the r e su l t s of the CBI 
I n d u s t r i a l Trends Survey, al though 
investment intentions remain strong in the 
capi ta l goods sector. The balance of 
firms in the CBI Survey reporting present 
fixed capacity to be more than adequate i s 
at i t s lowest level since 1979. Any 
con t inua t ion of the high l e v e l s of 
interest rates in the early weeks of 1985 
w i l l serve to d e p r e s s i n v e s t m e n t 
intentions further. 
Retail sales remained more buoyant than 
consumers' expenditure, r i s ing by 3% in 
the fourth quarter to a level 4.5% higher 
than a year earl ier . 
While the ra te of growth of consumers' 
expenditure slackened over 1984 there was 
marked accelerat ion in the pace of fixed 
investment. The volume of gross domestic 
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During 1984 government expendi ture 
exceeded planned t o t a l s . In the f i r s t 
t h ree q u a r t e r s of the year general 
government consumption was 3.8% above that 
of the corresponding period of 1983, with, 
within that t o t a l , central government 
expenditure growing a t almost the same 
rate. For fiscal year 1984/85 spending is 
forecast to be £2bn above the £126.3bn 
ta rge t . The overshoot in t o t a l spending 
resulted from higher than anticipated 
increases in social security payments, 
local authority spending, costs of the 
coal dispute and debt in t e res t payments. 
Part of the unanticipated expenditure was 
offset by windfall tax revenues from North 
Sea o i l as a consequence of s te r l ing 
depreciation and by revenues from the sale 
of Br i t i sh Telecom. Funding of the PSBR 
has already been completed on the 
assumption that the coal dispute would be 
s e t t l e d by Chris tmas. Thus, publ ic 
expenditure may be greater than budgeted 
for and the Government has shifted some 
spending i n t o next f i s c a l year by 
announcing a moratorium on regional aid 
grants in January 1985. 
The Public Expenditure White Paper 
published in January indicates that over 
the next three years government spending 
i s planned to remain constant in real 
terms. The planning total for 1985/86 is 
that outlined in the previous White Paper. 
In order to recover some of the ground 
l o s t in 1984/85, the Government i s 
planning to impose a cut in real spending 
during 1985/86. If i t can be achieved, 
that reduction will be larger, the greater 
i s the sum ca r r i ed forward from the 
current f i sca l year and the longer the 
coal dispute las ts . 
With i n v e s t m e n t , consumption and 
government expenditure increasing but 
domestic output sluggish, the balance on 
current account deteriorated over 1984, 
the-deter iora t ion being more marked in 
successive quarters . After a surplus of 
£424m in the f i r s t quarter, then a deficit 
of £379 in the second, the current account 
de f i c i t in the third quarter amounted to 
almost £550m. This pattern re f lec t s the 
increasing de f i c i t on non-oil t rade. As 
argued in the l a s t Commentary, the UK's 
non-oil trade performance is particularly 
disappointing in view of the depreciation 
of sterling during 1984. 
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Ster l ing 's weakness re f lec t s a number of 
f a c t o r s ; an unfavourable un i t cost 
performance; the unease and depressed 
growth resul t ing from the coal dispute; 
doubts about the conduct of UK monetary 
policy; downward pressures on oil prices 
and doubts about the cohesion of the OPEC 
ca r t e l ; and the strength of the dollar . 
Unt i l December 1984 the a u t h o r i t i e s 
permitted UK in te res t ra tes to follow 
movements in US in te res t r a t es . As a 
r e s u l t of i n c r e a s e d f e a r s about 
developments in oi l markets, however, 
pressure on s te r l ing intensified towards 
the end of the year. In te res t r a tes were 
raised to prevent further depreciation and 
in January the au thor i t ies re-introduced 
for one day the Minimum Lending Rate, 
d i scont inued th ree and a ha l f years 
earlier, to demonstrate authority over the 
markets. In January s te r l ing ' s trade-
weighted index stood 15% below i t s level 
of a year ea r l i e r . The factors causing 
s te r l ing ' s weakness remain, however, and 
the short-run prospect i s of in te res t 
rates staying around their present levels. 
Total industrial output was 2% higher in 
the third quarter of 1984 but was broadly 
unchanged when compared with a year 
ea r l i e r . Manufacturing output which has 
been l i t t l e affected by the coal dispute, 
showed signs of recovery with a r i se of 
1.5% over the previous three months. This 
increase was accounted for by higher 
output in chemicals and t e x t i l e s and 
clothing. Despite continuing growth i r 
consumer's expenditure, output of consumer 
goods increased only modestly. Similarly, 
despite the strength of the recovery in 
investment expenditure, output of capital 
goods was only marginally up over the 
quarter. There was, however, more rapid 
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recovery in the output of intermediate 
goods. 
THE LABOUR MARKET 
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
continue to increase at a ra te of 8.5%, 
broadly s imilar to the ra te of a year 
e a r l i e r . Thus, uni t costs continued to 
rise during the fourth quarter. More than 
offset t ing s t e r l ing depreciation meant, 
however , t h a t t h e UK's o v e r a l l 
competitiveness in manufacturing improved. 
Employment continued to increase during 
the th i rd and into the fourth quarter of 
1984 and at a slightly faster rate than in 
the second q u a r t e r . The under lying 
pattern of employment gains remains much 
the same as in earlier quarters, however, 
with the bulk of increases being recorded 
in the service sector and with most of the job gains being for par t - t ime workers. 
The decrease in manufacturing employment 
which had shown signs of slowing earlier 
in the year, appears to have been arrested 
towards the end of 1984. 
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Unemployment continued to r ise during the 
fourth quarter of 1984 and into January 
1985. While unemployment flows showed 
s igns of moderating during the l a s t 
quarter of 1984, this was sharply reversed 
in January. From November to January 
vacancies notified to Jobcentres fe l l . 
The slower contraction in manufacturing 
employment in conjunction with the modest 
recovery of manufacturing output, has 
meant a cont inuing d e c e l e r a t i o n of 
p roduc t i v i t y growth in t h i s s e c t o r , 
whether measured per man or per manhour. 
Earnings in manufacaturing, however, 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The major issue continues to be the coal 
dispute. Maintenance of e l e c t r i c i t y 
supply through the f i r s t half of the 
w i n t e r , th rea tened secess ion by the 
Nottinghamshire miners from the NUM and 
the well-publicised gradual drift back to 
work of s t r ik ing miners, brought the 
national dispute between the NUM and the 
NCB to a new stage and raised hopes of an 
imminent re-opening of talks. By the end 
of January, according to the NCB, more 
than 90% of Midlands and Nottinghamshire 
miners, 75% of Western, over 50% of North 
Derbyshire and 30% of Scottish miners but 
less than 10% of Yorkshire, Kent and South 
Wales miners were working. These figures 
underlay the fear of the na t iona l 
execut ive of the NUM t h a t the f i r s t 
anniversary of the dispute would see more 
than 50% of the i r members a t work and a 
break up of the union. 
The union's attempts to reopen talks were 
resisted by Iain McGregor who terminated 
the unofficial discussions between the 
national secretary of the NUM and the 
industrial relations director of the NCB, 
accusing the l a t t e r of exceeding his 
brief. The NCB's strategy of reject ing 
the offer of unconditional ta lks and 
i n s i s t i n g on a w r i t t e n agreement to 
discuss the closure of uneconomic p i t s 
prior to negotiation r e f l ec t s two main 
factors. First, the NCB is attempting to 
establish the contours of discussions with 
the NUM once the dispute i s over. 
Secondly, i t reflects Government pressure. 
The role of David Hart as an adviser to 
Mrs Thatcher, organiser of the working 
miners' groups and of t he i r l eg i s l a t i ve 
actions against the NUM, and a ' l ink ' 
between Thatcher and MacGregor i l lustrates 
the depth of the Government involvement in 
t he d i s p u t e . This second f a c t o r 
reinforces the implications of a Treasury 
Paper publ ished in December on the 
possibility of extending privatisation to 
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new fields including the mining industry, 
since such a policy would f i r s t require a 
fundamental weakening of the NUM. 
However, the Government may have to modify 
i t s position in response to the r is ing 
costs of substituting oil for coal, given 
the weakness of the pound, and to avoid 
the growing c r i t i c i s m t h a t i t i s 
unnecessa r i ly prolonging the dispute. 
The NCB strategy has led to increasing 
worries amongst the NACODS executive as to 
the value of t h e i r agreement on p i t 
closures. In the October negotiations 
NACODS had sought an early warning system 
on p i t closures to enable employees a t a 
threatened p i t to appeal for capi ta l to 
make the p i t productive again. This was 
rejected, allegedly by MacGregor, on the 
grounds tha t i t would in te r fe re with 
management's plans to manage to d i rec t 
i n v e s t m e n t and, hence , t o d e f i n e 
"economic" and "uneconomic" pits . 
Use of the pre-s t r ike provisions of the 
1984 Trade Union Act by Br i t i sh Leyland 
led to a £200,000 fine for the TGWU and 
the commencement of action for damages 
against a number of unions. Elsewhere 
l i t t l e use has been made of t h i s l e g i s -
la t ion , or of the closed shop provisions 
of the 1982 Employment Act which came into 
force in November. In an effort to avoid 
both confrontation and disruption, the 
practice amongst employers appears to be 
restricted to a formal statement that they 
wi l l no longer operate the provisions of 
the closed shop agreement. Trade unions 
wi l l have to make a more active response 
before March 1986 to the requirements of 
the 1984 Act in respect of po l i t i ca l 
funds. All unions with such funds wi l l 
have to follow the detailed and complex 
rules la id down by the Cert if icat ion 
Officer, not the leas t of which i s the 
requirement of a minimum of three scru-
tineers at each workplace ballot. 
The Government's proposals to abolish 
Wages Councils, as part of i t s policy to 
genera te increased f l e x i b i l i t y and 
mobi l i ty in the labour market, were 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y c r i t i c i s e d in t he 
recommendations of the Home Office 
Committee of Inquiry into proposals to de-
regulate opening hours for shops. The 
Committee argued s t rongly for the 
retention of the Wages Council, and for an 
adequately staffed inspectorate to ensure 
the protection of the shop worker. The 
experience of the aboli t ion of wages 
councils in other industr ies tends to 
support the Committee's recognition of the 
need to protect employees. 
PROGNOSIS 
In the wake of the recent increases in 
in t e res t r a tes to defend s te r l ing the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer has reaffirmed 
h i s commitment to the Medium Term 
Financ ia l S t r a t e g y . The fundamental 
element of the MTFS i s the need to 
maintain monetary demand in l ine with 
growth of the real economy and, thereby, 
t o r educe or c o n t a i n t h e r a t e of 
inflation. Allied to that is the pursuit 
of a r e s t r i c t i v e f i sca l policy aimed at 
reducing Government borrowing in order to 
reduce interest rates. Lowering inflation 
and in te res t r a tes wi l l lead, i t i s held, 
to higher levels of output and employment. 
UK economic policy cannot be conducted, 
however, independently of developments 
elsewhere. This i s seen clear ly with 
respect to interest rates. In the recent 
past the general level of in te res t ra tes 
has been determined by the rates necessary 
to fund the US budget deficit. But across 
countries interest rates vary around that 
general level ref lec t ing differences in 
expectations about domestic inf la t ion 
ra tes and exchange ra te movements. The 
pressure on sterling, which reflects both 
external and in ternal factors and which 
contributes to inflationary pressures, has 
resulted in UK interest rates being raised 
above the general level. Higher interest 
rates are aimed at halting sterling's fall 
and the statement of continuing commitment 
to the MTFS i s designed to dampen 
inflationary expectations. 
The recent decline in s te r l ing has been 
triggered by oi l price uncer ta int ies . 
Depreciation, which has accelerated since 
September against the dollar and, to a 
lesser extent, other currencies resu l t s 
also from a number of other influences. 
The strength of the dollar is undoubtedly 
one; the coal dispute another; and the 
behaviour of UK unit costs yet another. 
The conduct of monetary policy i tself is , 
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however, a l so an in f luence and the 
Chancellor's statement, which implies 
fa i th in present policy, i s unlikely to 
restore confidence to markets. 
In the March 1983 Budget the Chancellor 
s u b s t i t u t e d MO for other p rev ious ly 
targetted monetary variables, M1 and PSL2. 
Subsesquently MO has been well-behaved 
remaining within the target range. I t is 
widely recognised , however, t h a t MO 
indicates l i t t l e about the conduct of 
monetary policy. And as pointed out in 
earlier Commentaries the growth of other 
monetary aggregates such as M1 and PSL2 
has suggested expansionary monetary 
policy. As far as f inancial markets are 
concerned £M3 is the key monetary target. 
In the year to December 1984 £M3 grew less 
rapidly than M1 and PSL2. That recorded 
slower growth understates, however, under-
lying monetary expansion, the clues to 
which are seen in overfunding and the 
accumulation of commercial b i l l s by the 
Bank of England. 
During 1984 the Government indulged in 
debt sales in excess of the PSBR, i e . 
overfunding by more than £2bn. These debt 
sales reduced the growth of private sector 
deposits which largely determine £M3. In 
tu rn , r e s t r a i n e d depos i t growth has 
res t r i c ted banks' lending. Demand for 
credi t has continued to be sa t i s f i ed , 
however, by having the Bank of England buy 
commercial b i l l s at rates below those on 
bank overdrafts . Thus c red i t has been 
expanded without corresponding growth in 
£M3. 
Perception of such expansion suggests that 
the MTFS has been moved off course with 
consequent upward revision of inflationary 
expectations. Simultaneously, accel-
eration of UK monetary growth relative to 
that in other European countr ies , Japan 
and the US c o n t r i b u t e s to s t e r l i n g 
depreciation. 
The Chancellor's reaffirmation of faith in 
the MTFS thus rings hollow. A t igh ter 
monetary policy than a t present, with 
targetted aggregates more accu ra t e ly 
r e f l e c t i n g the monetary s t ance , i s 
required if he i s to succeed in cons-
t r a i n i n g p r e s s u r e s on s t e r l i n g and 
dampening inflationary expectations. The 
effects of a t igh te r monetary policy on 
growth can be offset if the Government at 
the same time relaxes f i sca l policy. 
Increased government spending could be 
directed, as argued elsewhere in t h i s 
Commentary to infrastructural improvement. 
And as US experience has shown, higher 
Government borrowing would at tract capital 
from abroad and reverse exchange ra te 
depreciation. Such a strategy may require 
UK in te res t r a t e s above general i n t e r -
national leve ls as at present, but i t 
would el iminate the dangerous fiction of 
current offical rhetoric. The US example 
of tight monetary and expansionary fiscal 
policy has been criticised because of i t s 
impact on international interest rates but 
i t i s one the Chancellor would be well 
advised to follow. 
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